


**THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(EAFORD)**



**“THE APARTHEID FRAUD:
THE SO-CALLED NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
DISPENSATION”**

by
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**Published by
The International Organisation for the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(EAFORD)
February 1984**

Printed by Ithaca Press, London SE1, UK. 1984

The views expressed in this Bulletin are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of EAFORD.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

“THE APARTHEID FRAUD: THE SO-CALLED NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION”

**by
Alfred T. Moleah, PH.D†**

November 2, 1983, whites in South Africa voted in a referendum to decide on a new constitution. If this had taken place in any other country, say Sweden, it would have been no more than routine democratic practice allowing the citizenry to express themselves on a new constitutional proposal. In fact, it would be totally unnecessary to even allude to the colour or race of the citizen-participants. But this referendum was conducted in apartheid South Africa; devised by the whites-only government to decide on a constitution worked out by a whites-only drafting committee and voted upon by a whites-only Parliament to map out the constitutional future and fate in a country where whites constitute a mere 17 per cent of the population.

The new constitution would include so-called Coloureds* and Indians** in a new three-chamber Parliament as distinctly junior and largely ineffectual partners in the running of what unmistakably remains an apartheid state. Discussions were held between the white authorities, on the one hand, and so-called leaders of so-called Coloureds and Indians, on the other hand. The so-called Coloured and Indian communities were never consulted and, as we shall presently see, were never allowed to express themselves on the new constitution. Whites, so-called Coloureds and Indians together make up 28 per cent of South Africa's population.

The vast African majority which constitutes 72 per cent of the population is excluded. Thus no discussions or consultation with Africans took place or were even contemplated. This is in keeping with the apartheid position that no African is or can ever be a citizen of South Africa and that the future and destiny of the African majority belongs in the areas designated Bantustans, homelands or, in the new apartheid-speak national states. These so-called homelands comprise 13 per cent of South African land surface, for 72 per cent of the population. This distributive anomaly is greatly compounded by many other factors, as we shall see.

The white minority regime has dared to characterise this blatantly fraudulent scheme as reform; a new constitutional dispensation; a move away from apartheid and racism; and many other specious labels to give the

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*People of mixed-descent.

**People of now Indian and Pakistani ancestry.

appearance of painful change. As usual, South African "daring" is not mindless or foolhardy, it calculates for success on Western connivance. South Africa was not wrong as Western governments and a large part of the media were able to see a silver-lining in the darkest cloud that South Africa devised. Incredibly this extreme machination was hailed as a new beginning; the beginning of the end of apartheid and the advent of democracy: even genuine and serious reform.

One can only wonder as to what had happened to Western governments' and a large segment of the Western media's discerning acuity. One can only imagine the reaction and incisive scrutiny of the West if some Socialist or even progressive Third World country offered what it termed reforms. One can only wonder as to why the lapse now. It is only with the greatest difficulty that one can resist invoking as a perceptive prism the adages that "blood is thicker than water" and "money talks": or even blinds.

The So-called New Constitutional Dispensation

Apartheid South Africa has been in a state of crisis for quite some time now. This derives simply from the contradiction of exclusive white power and privilege and the exclusion of 83 per cent of the country's population. The Verwoerdian vision of total and complete separation of the races had long been coming apart in the face of economic realities and staunch and determined resistance of its intended victims. As the Verwoerdian apartheid pipedream shattered, it became urgent to come up with a much more viable stratagem to preserve white power and privilege. This is essentially what the political manoeuvres are about; we shall take a deeper look later.

November 2, 1983, 2,062,469 whites went to the polls to decide in a referendum on a new constitutional proposal that had already been passed by the South African Parliament on September 9, 1983. They approved the new constitution massively by a two to one margin. The turnout was quite high – 76.02 per cent – of whom 1,360,223 (65.95 per cent) voted "Yes" and 691,577 (33.53 per cent) voted "No", while 10,669 (0.52 per cent) spoiled their ballots.¹ The ruling Afrikaner National Party scored an impressive victory, albeit with massive white English-speaking support and a serious split in Afrikaner ranks. The Prime Minister, Mr P. W. Botha, was personally strengthened and vindicated and thus given a white mandate to reshape South Africa's future and safeguard white power and privilege.

Essentially the new constitution proposes to incorporate the 2.7 million so-called Coloureds and the 850,000 Indians in a new three-chamber parliamentary system. Whites will elect 178 white members of a House of Assembly; so-called Coloureds will elect 85 so-called Coloured members of a House of Representatives; and Indians will elect 45 Indian members of a House of Deputies. The three chambers will be racially distinct and physically separate. The number of members in each chamber is

determined by a 4:2:1 ratio or formula which is constitutionally entrenched and can therefore not be changed or affected by a shift in population ratios. The clear intended purpose is to assure white dominance and control. As a further safeguard the entrenched provisions of the constitution cannot be amended except with the agreement of a majority of the membership of each of the three chambers.

Each chamber will legislate for the "own affairs" of its community (eg., housing, social welfare, health, education and local government) and no chamber can interfere in the "own affairs" of another community. In addition to exclusive "own affairs" there is also "general affairs" (eg., foreign affairs, defence, law and order, tax-raising and *African affairs*). Contact between the three chambers will be through a system of joint standing committees for "general affairs", whose working arrangement remains obscure.

There will be a Ministers Council for each community which will be concerned with that community's "own affairs". There will also be a National Cabinet selected by the State President which will attend to "general affairs"; it will include so-called Coloureds and Indians. Both the Ministerial Councils and the National Cabinet will be chosen by the State President and will have as their function discussion of legislation initiated by the State President. Disagreements between the three chambers will be adjudicated by a President's Council of 60 members, 20 of whom will be elected by the white chamber; 10 by the so-called Coloured chamber; 5 by the Indian chamber; 15 Members of Parliament nominated by the State President; and 10 Members of Parliament nominated by Opposition parties. Its decisions will be final and beyond the courts.²

Each chamber will choose members to an Electoral College of 88 members which will elect a State President. 50 members will be chosen by the white chamber; 25 by the so-called Coloured chamber; and 13 by the Indian chamber. It is a forgone conclusion that the State President will be an Afrikaner from the ranks of the dominant ruling National Party, and without doubt Mr Botha, the present Prime Minister.

The pivot of this constitutional scheme is the State President who is invested with awesome powers that one specialist in constitutional law described as: "decidedly undemocratic, smack of authoritarianism and create the potential for dictatorship."³ The State President will be the "supreme authority" with the power to declare martial law and war. In addition, after merely consulting the leaders of the three chambers, and he does not have to take note of their views, the State President could assume extraordinary powers by taking "such steps as he may deem necessary for the security of the state whenever the independence of the state is threatened or whenever the functioning of public institutions of government is interrupted."⁴

The military sees South Africa as being in a state of war – mortal combat to ward off onslaughts aimed at its destruction – a state of constant and persistent challenge. (We shall go more into this later.) In keeping with this perception and reasoning, the Westminster model is deemed not only unsuited but unable to deal with the ongoing crisis and likely to exacerbate it. Instead, the so-called De Gaulle option is substituted as necessary for the task ahead. Comments the same constitutional law specialist on the sweeping provision of power to the State President: “It strikingly resembles the highly contentious and notorious article of the Constitution of the Fifth (Republic) of France, which was tailor-made to suit the personality and constitutional perspective of General de Gaulle in order to allow him to reintroduce political stability and order into a country faced with endemic and recurring political crises caused by the French-Algerian debacle.”⁵

The South African provision goes one step further than its French analogue, as the same specialist worriedly observes:

This provision means that for a maximum period of 12 months the president could suspend parliament and, if he so chose, rule virtually as a dictator. This proposed emergency provision of the President’s Council’s constitutional committee is even more far-reaching than its French counterpart since in terms of article 16 ‘Parliament meets of a right’ during periods of emergency rule. It is manifest that such a sweeping power is open to abuse. It is also clear from this and other provisions that the proposed new constitutional structure is intended to contain recurring political crises and predicted parliamentary turbulence. This provision is in accordance with a reaffirmed guideline of the constitutional committee ‘that South Africa needs strong government, and any proposal of governmental paralysis must not be allowed to arise; accordingly, when consensus cannot be achieved, mechanisms for transcending dissent in order to assure effective government must be employed.’

And concludes, as already observed: “The mechanisms proposed to be employed in this regard are decidedly undemocratic, smack of authoritarianism and create the potential for dictatorship.”⁶

The State President will select the Cabinet at will from within and without the three chambers of Parliament and will chair its meetings. It is also the State President who will decide on which matters are “own affairs” and which are “general affairs”. Theoretically the President’s Council may be asked to advise the President on whether a matter is of “own” or “general” concern and can give verdicts binding on all parties in cases of conflict between the chambers; it is really the State President who will be the final arbiter since, amongst others, he will appoint 15 members of the President’s Council in addition to the 20 elected by the white chamber that

his party will control.

It is also the State President who will initiate legislation with the three racial/ethnic chambers only having the role of discussion of the submitted legislation. It will really be a presidential government or dictatorship with but a very thin veneer of what is generally accepted as the requisites of democratic government, albeit only for whites, so-called Coloureds and Indians who together constitute only 28 per cent of South Africa's population.

This constitution, as we shall presently see, represents a constitutional *coup d'état* by the South African military which has moved centre-stage. It is the military which ultimately is and will pay the price for apartheid, and it has decided, through its pointman, former Defence Minister P.W.Botha, now Prime Minister, to take charge of what it in the end has to pay the price for, or, at least, minimize that price. This has prompted one knowledgeable observer of the South African situation to offer:

Traditional democratic theory insists on a depoliticised military combined with the clear supremacy of civilian authority over strategic issues. How well the barracks are under the control of an elected government and parliament is considered the threshold between democratic and military rule. However, in white South Africa, as in Israel, this distinction does not apply. Increasingly, the entire society becomes militarised. In these states, the boundaries between politicians and the soldiers are fluid; personnel are interchangeable and both spheres merge. Rather than the politisation of the armed forces of the Latin American kind, the militarisation of the polity characterises the beleaguered ethnic state.⁷

The aim of the so-called new constitutional dispensation is to preserve apartheid, that is, white privileges and power, not to abandon or dismantle it. The difference between Botha and his military cohorts, on one hand, and his predecessors, on the other hand, is tactical not strategic. Only the rhetoric, style and tactics have changed, the essence of white privilege and control remain intact. So-called Coloureds and Indians are to be bribed into a foil to ensure white dominance. Their stake in the new set-up is at best illusory, in fact, a monumental sham. What is worse is that it is a sham bound to fail since, instead of resolving or reconciling the inherent contradictions, it has added to the contradictions, thus exacerbating them into even more sharpness.

The Apartheid Context

The always tenuous white minority government of South Africa felt particularly exposed and vulnerable when its *cordon sanitaire* disappeared with the revolutionary triumph over Portuguese colonialism and the liberation of Mozambique, June 25, 1975, and of Angola, November 11, 1975. The 1976

popular uprisings within South Africa, which were spearheaded by the students of Soweto and were soon to spread throughout South Africa, more than brought home the threat to white minority rule. The victory of revolutionary forces in Zimbabwe, March 1980, traumatized the South African racists with fear. In response to these historic events the South African racists frantically searched for new methods to avert their inevitable doom; and pathetically opted to tinker with the form of their dilemma rather than its substance. They opted for a series of interrelated counter-revolutionary measures to preserve and perpetuate their perverse and doomed social order.⁸

The South African military literally took over from the National Party politicians when the beleaguered and ultimately disgraced John Vorster ceded the premiership to the Defence Minister P.W.Botha in 1978. Botha's close ties to the military developed through the 13 years of his tenure in the defence portfolio. Together with a triumvirate of generals, Magnus Malan (Defence Minister) Constand Viljoen (South African Defence Force (SADF) Chief) and Jan Geldenhuys (Senior Army Command Officer) he has restructured the entire South African Government, with the reorganised State Security Council at the apex of the new structure and the locus of key decision making. This new approach is capsulated in the twin concepts of "total onslaught" and "total strategy" or "total war" response. A key figure in this regard is General Magnus Malan, the strategic thinker for Botha and the originator of "total war" to safeguard apartheid, who has put forth the position that the struggle to preserve white dominance is only 20 per cent military and 80 per cent political. This perception calls for a dual approach of strengthening the South African military in all respects, and political action to expand and solidify the base of white dominance; and to ameliorate the grievances of the African and thus blunt its growing revolutionary drift.

"Total strategy" is the essence of the so-called changes in South Africa. It is not reform or change. "Its central purpose is to rationalise apartheid and to convert what is in many ways an incoherent system of control into a smooth running machine of domination."⁹ When Botha warned his racist followers to "adapt or die", he meant methods and not the substance of apartheid. This is best brought out by a perceptive South African academic: "the Botha government has taken the first steps towards defining and implementing a series of specific and interrelated counter-revolutionary measures". And concludes from this:

This is the dividing line between the past and present, between previous Nationalist governments and that of P.W.Botha. Under Botha, a more conscious, concerted, and systematic effort is being made to integrate the various mechanisms of white control to produce a counter-revolutionary package more rationalised and efficient than at any time before. It is this

quality with its overtones of careful counter-revolutionary planning which distinguishes what the new government has come to term its 'total strategy' from white exercises in group defence on previous historic occasions.¹⁰

"Total Strategy" has also entailed a new emphasis on public relations – domestic and international – by refining the language and rhetoric of apartheid. The coarseness of the past is abandoned, and the bluntness of Verwoerd is eschewed – a new double-speak has become the style. The "language and symbols of government have undergone major change. While the term 'total strategy' is used to describe its policies for public consumption, in policy-making circles total strategy is labelled SMS, or Security Management System. The 'bantu homelands' have been miraculously transformed into 'black national states', the term 'apartheid' has been displaced by progressive-sounding 'multinational development', – racial segregation is now a matter of pseudo-scientific sounding 'vertical differentiation' "¹¹

A key aspect of "total strategy" is expansion of the demographic base of white dominance. This is to be done in two ways: incorporation and excision. Afrikaners who are the present masters of South Africa are only 2.8 million (8 per cent) of the population;¹² this is a very narrow base which just cannot survive, therefore, the Botha strategists have determined to improve this rather tenuous position through a strategem of incorporation without significantly diluting Afrikaner power. A number of factors have made this not only urgent but necessary and possible.

Not only are Africans the vast majority in South Africa, they are, in fact, growing into an even greater vastness. Exact or even just reliable figures on the African majority are impossible because of the official policy of manipulation to produce a white over-count and an African under-count; also the African's fear and suspicion in reporting accurately to the authorities since so many people are "illegals" or are just not sure of their status. Anyhow, estimates range from 22 to 25 million as opposed to 4.5 million whites; 2.7 million so-called Coloureds; and 850,000 Indians. What is even more worrisome to the apartheid overlords is that the gap is forever increasing. According to official report of the President's Council's science committee on demographic trends in South Africa, March 23, 1983, black population growth is at an "explosive" stage while that of whites is practically zero. Figures reported are: on average every 1,000 white women gave birth to 963 girls; every 1,000 Asian women gave birth to 1,278 girls; and every 1,000 so-called Coloured women gave birth to 1,427 girls; and estimated that every 1,000 African women gave birth to 2,500 girls.¹³

Its conclusions and recommendations are frighteningly ominous, and smack of genocidal possibilities, given the absolute premium that

Afrikaners place on their survival. The science committee recommended that introduction of a population programme be given the highest priority because there was a great uncertainty about the future growth of the African population which: "By the middle of the 22nd century it may have increased to anything between 70 and 190 million". Its chairman, Ernest Marais, said at a news conference that it had been concluded that 80 million was the maximum population South Africa would be able to cope with. And added: "A vigorously applied population programme should aim at reducing fertility to replacement level by the year 2020, which is only 37 years away, so that the ultimate population will taper off at 80 million". The report also expressed concern about the urban African population (a high concern of apartheid planners as we shall see), saying: "Compared to only eight million in 1980, the number of urban blacks could increase to between roughly 57 million and 96 million by the year 2050, depending on the success of a national population programme".¹⁴

After the Afrikaners came to power in 1948, when their National Party won the elections, they embarked on a systematic assault on the stranglehold on the country's economy by their English-speaking white counterparts. Through the use of state power, a good number of them have now established a firm niche in the country's economy. Many more managed to climb into the ranks of the white middle-class, thus letting their class position and economic stakes significantly dilute their feverish nationalism and its blind racial predicates. As a result this segment of the Afrikaner has grown pragmatic and, though still strongly committed to apartheid which underpins their class position, wants to make it more compatible with their class interests.

The South African academic quoted earlier attests to this with the observation that: "On the Afrikaner side, racial tradition has not yet broken before the forces of modernisation, yet intellectual and policy foci have shifted as it has become evident, except to the most dogmatic elements in the interpenetrating blocs of Afrikanerdom, that industrialisation has created networks of interdependency reducing the grand segregationist aims of apartheid to the level of pure fantasy".¹⁵

Botha's so-called reforms are nothing more than pragmatic adjustments to secure white supremacy. Through clever manoeuvres and slights of hand he is trying to let Afrikaners, and whites in general, have their cake and eat it. This is brought out by his rejoinder to a heckler who shouted out, when Botha discussed the need for more housing for Africans: "Send them to the homelands". Botha replied: "My friend, if they were all there, who would bring you your coffee in the morning?"¹⁶

Botha gained his impressive victory in the November 2nd referendum vote thanks to massive support of the English-speaking whites who have traditionally been in opposition to the National Party. The largest number

of "yes" votes came from Natal (72.65 per cent) and the Cape Province (73.67 per cent), provinces with large English-speaking segments as opposed to the largely Afrikaner provinces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State where the "yes" vote was 60.61 and 64.26 per cent respectively.¹⁷ This augurs well for the other aspect of "total strategy".

This is to forge an alliance or partnership with the English-speaking whites to defend white privilege in the new mode of neo-apartheid. The aim is to fuse Boer and English in a new overarching "South Africanism" that will be the basis for the new politics of national survival.¹⁸ This is not a difficulty as most English-speakers only object to the zealous and excessive aspects of apartheid and not its substance. The private sector, which is still largely English, has also been included in this strategic alliance. So has the academic community, to constitute a government-university-industrial axes. Frankel's observations on this score are quite incisive, he observes:

The private sector's response to government overtures, carefully formulated as a response to the 'Marxist onslaught' and temptingly offering access to public decision-making, has been generally favourable. Total strategy with its managerial connotation tends to breed business confidence in government, and the private sector is alert to the decided advantages of a closer relationship with the authorities. In the past, the major point of difference between the two derived from the strain imposed on economic growth by hard-line apartheid ideology. From the point of view of the private sector, rigid apartheid prompted unnecessary governmental intervention in the form of restrictive labour legislation, prohibition on project locations, job reservation, and so forth; the net result being to stifle private initiatives and constrain production, profits and access to an enormously expanding black market. Today however, with government espousing the values of the market and optimum growth and clearly willing to roll back many legislative impediments on production and profits, the climate is vastly different.¹⁹

The Black-consciousness Movement with its assertion of black pride and calls to unity of all non-whites as blacks gained strength in the 1970s, leading up to the popular uprisings of 1976. Such black unity (Africans, so-called Coloureds and Indians) greatly disconcerted and threatened the racist regime of South Africa, which in pursuit of its apartheid mania, had in part created the conditions of unity of all blacks. A new strategy of divide-and-rule became not only necessary but urgent. This comported well with the aim of expanding the demographic base to safeguard white privilege. So-called Coloureds and Indians were also to be incorporated in the new strategic alliance, albeit as junior partners lured by bigger scraps from the master's table. Frankel is again quite incisive in observing:

Under "Total Strategy" the lines of divide and rule have also been shifted from distinctive black-white racial boundaries, and there are definite moves afoot to wean the ambiguously situated Indian and Coloured communities into the minority camp in order to deny their numerical advantages and organisational and leadership skills to the black majority. In this regard the government has moved tentatively towards deracialising the core of 'white' South Africa in a fashion designed specifically to widen the inequalities between Indian and Coloured on the one hand, and blacks on the other. Administrative exemptions under the Group Areas Act now allow Indians and Coloureds the right to house black servants on their premises, and Indian and Coloured socio-economic demands generally received preference over those of blacks when it comes to the expenditure of government energies or monies. Under the administrative rationalisation programme the departments of Coloured Relations and Indian Affairs have been absorbed into a single Department of Internal and Constitutional Affairs which will eventually take over the work of the white Ministry of the Interior. In terms of its vision of an eventual 'non-black' state composed of whites, Indians and Coloureds, the government is now also committed to a policy of decentralising power to allow Indians and Coloureds maximum control over their own affairs, and to consulting with both communities on matters of common interest and mutual concern. Thus, the proposed President's Advisory Council, seen by many *verligte* Afrikaners as a stage to power-sharing between the three minority communities, provides for Coloureds and Indians on par with whites, while blacks are confined to a segregated and subordinate advisory body.²⁰

Africans are not included in the so-called new dispensation as they have already been assigned a homeland or bantustan dispensation. This dispensation, as a total solution, has now come into serious questioning by South Africa's strategic thinkers simply because of its manifest unreality: not only have urban Africans now disappeared as Verwoerd envisaged, they have greatly grown in numbers and militancy. Urban Africans have also become critical to the economy, increasing instead of diminishing their role in it.

Incredibly, "Total Strategy" envisages a divide and rule even among Africans – between rural and homelands Africans on the one hand, and urban Africans, on the other – to weaken their opposition to apartheid and thus render it containable. Urban Africans are to be given privileges, albeit not anywhere equal to whites, but considerably more than their rural and homelands brethren. Their permanence in the urban areas is grudgingly conceded in the form of ninety-nine year leaseholds; greater job-area mobility has been afforded them; social facilities have been improved and extended; and they are to be allowed a greater measure of local autonomy.

All these are calculated to assuage their deep longing for national self-determination, and their abiding hatred of apartheid. This strategy is more strange than strategic – it is stranger than fiction.

The so-called new dispensation is still-born. It is a non-starter from its very conception and inception. It futilely tries to avoid the core of the apartheid dilemma – the inalienable and non-negotiable rights of the African majority in the land of their birth and ancestors. It mocks at history by trying to manipulate its inexorable march to freedom for the African majority. No amount of strategizing can avoid this inevitable outcome.

Fatal Contradictions

“I am giving you a final warning” said Botha to a militant group of so-called Coloureds, “One man one vote is out; that is to say never.”²¹ In fact, Botha had already gone one better than Ian Smith of Rhodesia in declaring that black majority rule would not come, not only in his life-time, but in that of his children. This desperate defiance of historical forces has become the standard valediction of doomed social orders.

The African majority is not considered in this so-called new dispensation or plan to shape the future of South Africa. Botha has repeatedly stated that: “There is no hidden agenda” to include the African majority. And, incredibly, went on to describe the referendum vote as: “It is a decisive majority in favour of the attempt to secure security, peace, stability and prosperity for South Africa.”²² This exclusion of the African majority is the most fatal flaw of the so-called new dispensation. It is the African majority that will secure a future for South Africa, as well as determine that future.

Botha in announcing the “special dispensation” in the House of Assembly, said that: “Indian and coloured people should share in decision-making at local, provincial and parliamentary levels;” and in reply to a question from the Leader of the Opposition on whether discriminatory legislation such as the Group Areas, Mix Marriages and Separate Amenities Acts would be removed with the introduction of the “new dispensation”, he replied that they would remain to prevent “social abuse”.²³ Thus, even for the so-called Coloureds and the Indians, their participation is circumscribed by the apartheid framework that the so-called new dispensation retains, in fact, entrenches.

A survey conducted by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer indicated that less than a quarter of the so-called Colored population accepted the so-called new dispensation, and that over 90 per cent predicted instability and violence if the proposal was implemented. A similar survey among Indians showed that Indians overwhelmingly rejected any constitutional dispensation which excluded Africans, and more than 90 per cent of Indians interviewed indicated that they expected black resentment, violence and political instability if Africans were excluded from any constitutional dis-

pensation in South Africa.²⁴

The new chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond (the Afrikaner think-tank that determines policy and is the power behind the throne), Professor Jan de Lange, indicated in an interview that "Afrikaners still stick by their belief in apartheid. The policy of apartheid, or separate development of the races as it is called today, 'is not under question. That is central' he says."²⁵ The assertions by Botha and de Lange expose the utter emptiness of this so-called new dispensation and reveal the sham that it is – a mere manoeuvre to retain and perpetuate white privilege and control.

The third week of October 1983, during the hectic campaign on the referendum vote, the anomalies and contradictions of the so-called new dispensation were concretely revealed in the Mayfair suburb of Johannesburg, which has, in fact, become racially integrated because of the spill over of Indians and so-called Coloureds from neighbouring Fordburg suburb. Campaigning there, S.F. Kotze, Minister of Community Development and Louis Le Grange, Minister of Law and Order, warned nonwhites to leave now or face drastic legislative action later. This was in response to lower class Afrikaner residents' anger at the ultimate humiliation of living next to non-whites. According to Cassim Saloojee, chairman of a group called Actstop, which was formed in 1979 to offer legal protection against evictions for so-called Coloureds and Indians, 14,000 people in the Johannesburg municipal area stand to be affected if the threat is carried out.²⁶

The utter insanity of apartheid – the schizophrenia of the Afrikaner – and the psychotic nature of this so-called new dispensation is brought out by Cowell of the *New York Times*, stating:

Apartheid may be constitutionalized, but it will not be without anomalies. In one part of Mayfair, Bibi Moolla lives a life divided by the Group Areas Act, the legislation that determines where people may reside. Her house lies on the border between Mayfair, the nominally white suburb, and Fordsburg, an area designated as Indian. Mrs Moolla, a woman of Indian descent, may not use her front door because it lies in the white part of the house. The side entrance is in the Indian area of town.

'I never have a bath,' she said in a wry joke at her own expense. The reason is that the dividing line runs through her modest bathroom. The wash-basin is, for her, legal because it is on the 'Indian' side. The bathtub, however, lies on what is technically whites-only land and so her use of it is officially illegal.²⁷

The South African government did not dare to conduct a referendum among so-called Coloureds and Indians because it knew well that the so-called new dispensation would be overwhelmingly rejected. Instead of

consulting these communities, as it had the white community, it has opted for the tried and tested colonial practice of only dealing with the hand-picked "leaders". As of old, these so-called leaders are bribed and blackmailed into obeisance, and are by fiat annointed the enlightened embodiments of their people.

The Coloured Labour Party, on January 4, 1983, decided to participate in the so-called new constitutional dispensation. The leadership of the Labour Party tried to squirm out of their betrayal and infamy by arguing that they were not abandoning their principles but were acquiring a new political base, from which they could be promoted. Shamelessly declared David Curry: "South Africa is in the process of reform, we are going to be part of that process. We are going to be sitting there, forcing the pace." The Labour Party leader, the Reverend Allan Hendrickse, appealed to Africans to trust the Labour Party to negotiate on their behalf from a position inside the Government. Equally shameless he declared: "The Labour Party believes that no constitutional arrangement that does not include the largest number of South Africans can ever be regarded as final." And went on to reaffirm his opposition to the Group Areas Act, totally ignoring the fact, recently, the Prime Minister, Botha, in a pledge to white voters had put the Group Areas Act high on the list of subjects which will remain "non-negotiable" in the so-called new dispensation.²⁸

In accepting participation, the Labour Party leadership exhibited rank opportunism. It abandoned even the semblance of principle. At various times in the past it had made its acceptance of a role in the so-called new dispensation conditional on the extension of a similar offer to Africans, the drafting of a bill of rights, the inclusion of so-called Coloureds on a common voters roll with whites and inclusion inside the same Parliamentary chamber, and the holding of a referendum amongst so-called Coloureds and Indians.²⁹ When Botha rejected these, they simply capitulated to accept the crumbs from the master's table. One of the delegates to the conference put this opportunism starkly: "If you can't marry the one you love, why not marry the one you can get?"³⁰

This decision by the Labour Party's sell-out leadership is vehemently and overwhelmingly opposed by the so-called Coloured community. This is particularly so in the Cape Town region where about 70 per cent of them live. Since deciding to be a part of the so-called new dispensation, the Labour Party has found it impossible to hold open meetings in Cape Town. Allan Hendrikse was forced to cancel all rallies and meetings in the Cape Town area after he was heckled and shouted down by students and workers at every one he tried to hold. Opposed to the Labour Party's stand is a well-developed network of neighbourhood-based network of 60 civil associations of students, and trade unions which subscribed, immediately after the Labour Party's betrayal, to a statement: "We reject the Labour Party as

being in any way representative of the oppressed in their struggle for a non racial, democratic South Africa.”³¹

Because of this very strong opposition from the so-called Coloured community, especially in the majority Cape Town region, the conference that approved participation in the so-called new dispensation was literally rigged to ensure approval. In the first place, the conference was held in Natal, quite a distance from Cape Town, and only about 60 of the 350 delegates came from the Cape Town region which comprises about 70 per cent of South Africa’s 2.7 million so-called Coloureds.³²

The Indian community was also not consulted. Its so-called leadership has also opted for forgoing a referendum, which would certainly result in an overwhelming rejection. The South African Government has by fiat annointed the Indian Council the representative organ of the Indian community, and its leader, Amichand Rajbansi, chairman of the South African Indian Council, its embodiment. Mr Rajbansi is popularly known by the sobriquet “Mr 8 per cent”, for that was the turn out among Indians in the election that brought him to power.

Because of overwhelming opposition in the Indian community, the so-called leadership has resorted to all kinds of stratagems to flout the popular will. Botha addressed a meeting of Indians after his referendum triumph, where he urged them to participate in his co-called new dispensation. Eighty per cent of the Indians live in Natal which is also the home base of the Zulus. Botha told the Indians that an alterative to his offer was for Indians to align themselves with the 6 million Zulus and thus be swamped. He played on Indian fears in the aftermath of the 1949 riots in which Indians were killed by Zulus. The meeting Botha addressed was by invitation only, and was held at 2pm “a time that seemed to permit only those in official favour, or with a degree of economic autonomy, to attend. At that hour, those opposed to Mr Rajbansi would probably not get time off from work in any great numbers to register differing sentiments.”³³

In the black communities (i.e., Africans so-called Coloureds and Indians) opposition to the so-called new dispensation is strong and widespread. The general perception is that this is not reform of apartheid, which cannot be reformed in the first place, but a not-so-clever way to entrench apartheid and divide the black communities to keep them politically weak. Even bantustan leaders have voiced strong opposition. October 5, 1983, six homelands leaders met and thereafter issued a rejection of the so-called new dispensation. Surprisingly, the group included Kaiser Matanzima, President of the Transkei Bantustan, who had accepted “independence” seven years ago.³⁴

The fraudulent scheme by the South African racist regime has stirred the most intense opposition in the black communities. Remarking on the African reaction, the *Financial Times* observed: “Not surprisingly, their

rejection of the constitution is almost unanimous. But it is being uttered with a force and anger which have not been heard in public for years."³⁵ Spearheading the opposition was the United Democratic Front, an alliance of over 400 grass-root organisations of Africans, so-called Coloureds, Indians and whites which came into being August 20, 1983. Also active was the National Forum, an alliance of over 200 grass-roots organisations with a black consciousness orientation.

Because of massive opposition, the government and its so-called leaders of the Labour Party and the Indian Council decided to forgo referendums in the so-called Coloured and Indian communities, and simply hold elections for the parliamentary members. The Labour Party took this decision at a congress held, not in Cape Town, but in the eastern Cape city of Port Elizabeth early January 1984. Those elections when held will be boycotted, but as in the case of Soweto, (in two elections the participation was 6 per cent and 10.7 per cent) the government will go ahead anyhow and give its blessings to the unpopular outcome. The rank opportunism of the Labour Party is best brought out by:

But the Labour Party's decision is questionable on the grounds of political strategy. Botha needed its participation badly, for he would have looked extremely foolish if he had split his own party in efforts to woo the coloured people, only to be spurned by them. Instead of exploiting this situation and making its participation conditional upon Botha's prior agreement to concede certain demands, the party has decided to agree first and negotiate terms afterwards. In so doing, it has thrown away its bargaining trump card.³⁶

As in Namibia,³⁷ this fraud will not succeed. Even the sell-out and "Uncle Tom" so-called leadership will not be able to abide the contradictions. Hendrikse and Rajbansi will live to regret their selling out in return for nothing. Pressure from the outside will force them to make demands that apartheid will not countenance, thus, nakedly exposing their betrayal and "Uncle Tomism". The white racists will not allow them even the semblance of dignity, but will deepen and exploit their compromised condition. Hendrikse will come to terms with the reality of apartheid racism which will reveal the emptiness of his pledge: "We realise it is flawed (the new constitution). But it is a starting point. We intend going in there to fight for further changes, particularly for the inclusion of the blacks."³⁸

Conclusion

The litmus test of any change or reform in South Africa is the African majority – they, and they alone, are central to apartheid. It is only with regard to their position, rights and possibilities that one can measure change in South Africa. So far the position of the African majority, not only remains

unchanged, but has got worse in many respects. Their discrimination remains constant and their disabilities and suffering continue unabated.

The most perfidious aspect of “total strategy” or the so-called new dispensation is the denationalisation of just about all Africans, in keeping with the Verwoerdian grand apartheid aim of not having any black citizens in white South Africa. This perfidy and tragedy of apartheid is best brought out by John Dugard, a South African professor of law, in observing:

In South Africa today, there is so much heady talk of reform, new constitutional plans, and movement away from discrimination that the National party government’s most blatant act of race discrimination since the inception of apartheid in 1948 – the withdrawal of South African nationality from some eight million blacks that accompanied the granting of ‘independence’ to Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) – has gone largely unnoticed, or has at least failed to receive the attention it deserves.

The conferral of ‘independence’ on these ‘states’ has been so skillfully presented as an exercise in self-determination and as an extension of political rights to blacks that the full horror of this action has been obscured. Not only have millions of blacks living in those homeland-states been transformed into foreigners overnight by legislative decree, but so too have several million blacks living permanently in the urban areas of South Africa itself. Pretoria has set in motion the implementation of its ultimate fantasy – a South Africa in which there are no black South African nationals or citizens; a South Africa that cannot be accused of denying civil and political rights to its black nationals for the simple reason that there will be no black South Africans, only millions of migrant labourers (or guest workers, as the fantasy sees them) linked by nationality to a collection of unrecognised, economically dependent mini-states on the periphery of South Africa.³⁹

Grand apartheid thinking as devised by Verwoerd elected to deal with the problem of the African majority by the simple stratagem of excision. In 1978, Dr.C.P.Mulder, then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development stated in Parliament:

If our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship . . . Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this parliament to accommodate these people politically.⁴⁰

This policy of denationalisation is vigorously pursued as an intrinsic part of “total strategy” or the new dispensation. Since 1976, Bophuthatswana,

Venda and Ciskei have also attained "independence" accompanied by denationalisation of eight million Africans whose nationality is now assigned to the so-called "independent homelands" or "national states", in the newspeak. The government is pursuing denationalisation relentlessly, stopping at nothing to achieve it. Again John Dugard is quite insightful in observing:

That the government is determined to denationalise black South Africans as rapidly as possible is further illustrated by the proposed transfer of South African territory to the Kingdom of Swaziland. By this scheme, some 800,000 Swazi South African nationals, at present linked with the homeland of KaNgwane, will cease to be South African nationals and become nationals of Swaziland. Self-governing homelands that continue to oppose independence – notably KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu and QwaQwa – are, moreover, being subjected to pressure to opt for independence by land excisions in favour of independent states (Swaziland) or self-governing states well disposed toward independence. Hence the attempt to excise the Ingwavuma district from KwaZulu and to cede it to Swaziland, and the fear that parts of Lebowa will be handed over to the miniscule KwaNdebele, which has announced its intention of becoming independent in 1984.⁴¹

Two homelands have become "independent" since Botha took office, thus attesting to the fact that this policy is still very much in place. "The truth is that the fantasy of South Africa with no black South African nationals remains central to National Party constitutional planning. Hence the failure of the government's constitutional proposals to make any provision for black participation in the political decision-making process of South Africa itself. Coloureds and Indians are to be accommodated in some new political order with whites because they are less in number than the white population, but the numerically more powerful blacks must be content with political rights in 'independent' homelands."⁴²

In addition to wholesale denationalization of Africans through the granting of so-called independence to these apartheid entities, a recent study by the surplus people project notes that 3.5 million Africans have been forced-removed to the so-called homelands and another two million are scheduled to be forced-removed. South Africa has devised ten small and extremely impoverished so-called homelands as the fate and destiny of the 72 per cent African majority. These so-called homelands are pathetic dumping grounds for what South Africa determines to be the excess African population; the surplus people, not considered to be able to minister to the interest of whites in white South Africa. They are simply dumped in the "homelands" to afford whites a manageable African numerical equation. Botha, in spite of his rhetorical reformism has vehemently pursued this

policy. This is the reality that any notion of change has to take into account.

The so-called new dispensation is a sham. African disabilities continue unabated. All the constitutional manoeuvring will fail, if it does not address itself to the central dilemma of apartheid – the overwhelming African majority.

Africans in South Africa have a renewed confidence in their abilities to fashion and determine their future, and in the complete confidence that history is on their side. They are South Africa, and there will be no South Africa without them. No amount of “strategic thinking” or constitutional manoeuvring will prevent this inevitable outcome. Freedom and liberty will come to South Africa; and in our life time. After Namibia there shall be Azania.

1. *The Times* (London), November 4, 1983.
2. *Ibid* and *Financial Times*, November 2, 1983.
3. George Devenish, "The Second President's Council Report on Constitutional Reform: End of White Rule in S.A.?", *South Africa International*, Vol.13, No.3, January 1983, p.203.
4. Second Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, p.55/6.62 quoted in *Ibid.*, p.202.
5. *Ibid*, p.203.
6. *Ibid*.
7. Heribert Adam, "Outside Influence on South Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.21, No.2, June 1983, p.244.
8. For a fuller discussion see Alfred T. Moleah. *Namibia: The Struggle Liberation*, Wilmington, DE: Disa Press, 1983, pp.154-167.
9. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy' ", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol.xviii, No.3, November 1980, p.284.
10. *Ibid*, p.273.
11. *Ibid*, p.276.
12. *New York Times*, October 9, 1983.
13. *New York Times*, March 24, 1983.
14. *Ibid*.
15. Philip Frankel, *op.cit.*, p.275.
16. Robert I. Rotberg, "How Deep A Change", *Foreign Policy*, No.38, Spring 1980, p.130.
17. *The Times*, London, November 4, 1983.
18. James M. Roberly, "Beyond Limpopo and Zambezi: South Africa's Strategic Horizons", *South Africa International*, Vo. 14, No.1, July 1983, p.323.
19. Philip Frankel, *op.cit.*, p.278.
20. *Ibid*, pp.279-280.
21. Quoted in Robert I. Rotberg, *op.cit.*, p.137.
22. *New York Times*, November 4, 1983.
23. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982*, Johannesburg: South Africa, Institute of Race Relations, 1983, p.21.
24. *Ibid*, pp.16 and 21.
25. *Christian Science Monitor*, November 3, 1983.
26. *New York Times*, October 31, 1983.
27. *Ibid*.
28. *New York Times*, January 5, 1983.
29. *Ibid*.
30. *Ibid*.
31. *New York Times*, February 14, 1983.
32. *Ibid*.
33. *New York Times*, November 16, 1983.
34. *The Times*, London, October 6, 1983.
35. *Financial Times*, October 21, 1983.
36. *South Magazine*, March 1983.
37. See Alfred T. Moleah, *op.cit.*, pp.168-190 and pp.299-314.
38. *Washington Post*, January 5, 1984.
39. John Dugard, "Denationalisation: Apartheid's Ultimate Plan", *Africa Report*, July-August 1983, p.43.
40. *Ibid*, p.44.
41. *Ibid*.
42. *Ibid*, pp.44-45.

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