


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ZIONIST IDEOLOGY--OBSTACLE TO PEACE
by
ELMER BERGER

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

ZIONIST IDEOLOGY: OBSTACLE TO PEACE

by
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I

“The Missing Link”

It is a platitude – after more than 30 years – to describe the so-called “Arab/Israel” confrontation with discouraging adjectives such as “stubborn”, “intractable”, “resistant to normal diplomacy”. More pessimistic observers often use depressing terms like, “insoluble”, “irreconcilable”, “irrational”. U Thant, when he was Secretary General of the United Nations, called it a new “hundred years war”. Whichever of these usual descriptions is preferred is eloquent testimony to failed diplomacy – of all kinds, good and bad – in the search for a formula to terminate the hostilities. “The Camp David process” is the latest performance. It was launched with great éclat in 1978-79. It is now clear that even if “the process” produces the much heralded “comprehensive peace” it will be only after profound alterations of the formula blue-printed at the renowned Presidential hide-away.

Despite this dreary record of three decades of failure the conventional diplomats persist in promoting formulas which, for the most part, are warmed-over versions of previous failures. Hope seems to spring eternal that drawing a border here rather than there, a quibble for some vague amelioration of the tragedy of Palestinians (called “refugees” by the more mendacious or innocent), some re-cycled system of guarantees for Israel’s “security” or some internal political transformation in either the Zionist state or one of the confrontation Arab states will be the magic formula. In other words, a careful study of the dozens of formulas and modalities with which some serious and some cynical statesmen have attempted to substitute peace for the continuing war, provides evidence that when all the sales-talk is illuminated by knowledge of the historic, organic causes of the problem, nothing new has been added. The same old pieces have simply been moved about on the same old board. All the games so far have ended as a draw.

One element common to all these failures is that none has formally included Zionism in the agenda of issues to be negotiated. This is a strange “over-sight” because, from the very beginning of the Palestine problem, in the Balfour Declaration era, the Zionist organization was a party to the negotiations. The Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Palestine, negotiated with the United Nations during the partition debate in 1947-48. The “Declaration of the Establishment” of the State of Israel specifies “the Zionist Movement” as one of the “establishers”. And the organic relationship of the government of the State and the World Zionist

Organization is evident in the daily coordination of activities of the two and is detailed in formally enacted Israeli law.¹

One of the reasons for this diplomatic reticence about Zionism is that the World Zionist Organization (the progenitor of the Zionist State of Israel) sedulously cultivated confusion about several different and often contradictory varieties of the phenomenon.

Undeniably, "Zion" (and not necessarily Zionism) is one of the *sancta* of traditional or orthodox Judaism. This Zion, in its authentic, orthodox meaning, is a theological – not a political/nationalistic – concept. In God's wisdom, when "the people" morally merited it, God would usher in the millennium by sending the messiah to lead "the children of Israel" back to Zion. Distilling this "future hope" out of a correct interpretation of relevant Old Testament texts, these orthodox Jews understood the ancient Israelites and Judeans lost the Holy Land because they had sinned. They had gone "whoring" after other gods and engaged in a long list of injustices towards fellow humans. Judaism is a "covenant" religion. The covenant changed from age to age, but it was always a contract between "the people" and God. God "promised" them the land and would prosper them in it *if* "the people" rigorously fulfilled the precise moral and ethical stipulations of the covenant as it was interpreted by "God's prophets" in any particular age. Micah spoke for all the prophets when he warned (III: 9-10:12) "Zion will be plowed" and "Jerusalem shall become a heap" because the people "abhor justice and pervert all equity". Only God – not men or any combination of men – could make the judgment of whether or not the conduct of the people had reached the point of moral excellence to repair the covenant and so clear the way for God to restore them to the land.

Interpreted in this accurate sense, not even the enormous tragedy of the holocaust could authenticate "the return". The Zionist exploitation of the tragedy perpetrated by Nazism is a better-than-average expedient to explain the establishment of the Zionist state. But it is a human explanation, not the fulfillment of Divine purpose. And the established state is anything but "a house of prayer for all peoples". (Isaiah LXVI:7.)

It is crucial to recognise that the decisive, definitive factor distinguishing this religious/messianic Zionism from the political/territorial Zionism which built the Israeli state is the austere, stringent morality which is embraced in the unquestionable authority of God. God – not men – will determine the time and appoint the leader for "the return" as it is conceived as a sacrament for some Jews.

Perhaps the most authentic – certainly the most dramatically visible – observers of this tradition in Judaism are the Neturai Karta (Guardians of the City) in Jerusalem, itself. Rabbi Avram Blau was acknowledged as a leader of this group. The story is told that when the Israeli General in command of the troops who invaded Jerusalem in the 1967 fighting met Blau on the street leading to the quarter where the Neturai Karta was con-

centrated, the General expected a hero's welcome. He advised Blau that his congregants could now fulfill their spiritual dream of praying at the "Wailing" or West Wall. But the Rabbi responded to these "good tidings" with a stern rebuke. "When God prepares the way and commands we will go", he is reported to have said. "But we will not go at the invitation of your soldiers". The story may be apocryphal, but it could well have happened. It accurately reflects the substance of the religious Zionism of these devout Jews.

One of American Judaism's most distinguished theologians, Dr Jakob Petuchowski, has said of such Jews – many of whom came to Zion even before there was a Zionist state –

Politically . . . they had no aspirations whatsoever. On the contrary, they deemed all efforts directed at creating a Jewish State in Palestine to be sinful interference with the messianic time-table of Almighty God.²

There are legitimate, *theological* disagreements with this orthodox doctrine. Some of those disagreements are found among Jews, themselves. Probably the most unequivocal theological dissent was proclaimed in 1885 in a creedal declaration issued by a group of Reform Jewish rabbis in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Known as the Pittsburgh Platform, it stated

We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community. And therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state.

Anti-Zionism and opposition to a Zionist state has been – and is – therefore a legitimate position in Judaism. There were –and are – Jews who far from incorporating political Zionism as a part of their faith have regarded it as a moral imperative to stand in opposition.

It would be less than candid to leave the implication that the demonstrable existence of this anti-Zionist tradition implies indifference to the fate of humans now comprising the majority population of the Israeli state. Historically, the general perception of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish population of Palestine at any given time) was one of "refuge" from the oppressive societies of Eastern and Central Europe and later, of course, in an intensified version after the rise of Hitler. This remains the dominant image among the majority of western European and American Jews. Most do not belong to any Zionist organization. Most would accept the description of "non-Zionist", however vague this term is to the point of meaninglessness. They have also sometimes been called "philanthropic Zionists". On the whole, they are sadly uninformed – or misinformed – about the specifics of the political issues of the Palestine problem. "Arab" information, by and large, has been both inadequate and inept. Responsible anti-Zionist information by Americans (or West Europeans) has been plagued by lack of resources

and consistently over-shadowed by heavily financed and expertly designed Zionist propaganda. Lacking effective presentation of their own, official positions, Arabs have been victimized by Zionism's representation of them in the worst, possible stereotypes of their humanity and aspirations.³ The PLO is "dedicated to terrorism for the sake of terror". The Arab states are determined "to drive the Jews into the sea". Israel's obstructionist policies in every effort to attain a peace are always reasonable precautions for Israel's "security".

Even this abbreviated delineation of this most prevalent attitude among Jews suggests that none of these positions should be invested with the sanctity of religious doctrine. They are defensive positions. They react to real or Zionist-fabricated threats to what is now a significant number of Jews whose existence in a part of Palestine is a fact of history and of *realpolitik*. "Philanthropic Zionists" do not perceive any Arab resistance to Zionism as a threat to *their* legitimate rights. For the most part, these Jews do not fully comprehend the significance of the Zionist state's gratuitous, legislative grant to *them* of Zionist national/political rights and obligations. Where even partial comprehension exists these Jews reject the grant, once they understand it as a form of "dual nationality" fused into their Judaism.

Clarification of these matters is important so that knowledgeable and responsible critics of past and present policies of the Zionist state may feel free to speak their judgments, uninhibited by the Zionist-nourished misrepresentation accusing such critics of attacking legitimate rights of Jews or derogating some authentic sacrament of Judaism. Free, informed and civil debate of the political issues will be as helpful to these "philanthropic" Jews as to the rest of the world, now acutely concerned with Middle East peace. In fact, since Jews have been more directly the targets of Zionist propaganda and therefore – after the Palestinians themselves – the greatest victims, releasing constructive critics of destructive Israeli policies from any sense they are contributing "anti-Semitic" injury to Jews may be more helpful to these Jews than to others. Such a release from a sense of guilt could recruit new, informed, responsible participants in the expanding, public debate about Palestine and Middle East peace. New participants would accelerate clarification of the specifics of the political issues, providing guidance for and impact upon wider audiences, including many of these "non-Zionist" "philanthropic" Jews. This, in turn, would inevitably influence politicians and decision-makers of the "great powers" who so heavily influence policy. And these, in turn, might then be relieved of the hobgoblin of the Zionist concocted myth of a "Jewish people" holding one-dimensional, homogeneous political views and prepared to operate as a blackmailing, political lobby. A sequence of such developments would provide the optimum of freedom for the inevitable and expanding political debate over resolution of the Middle East's oldest and so far most intractable problem. And such free debate is also the minimal necessity for most

of the political leaders of the west who are more often followers of unreliable public opinion polls and submissive servants of the loudest, special pleaders than genuinely creative leaders.

This brief exploration of religious motivations and of the doctrine of messianic Zion would be incomplete without mention of the “fundamentalists” or “Biblical literalists” of various denominations of Christianity. These Christians also consider the “return of the Jews” to the Holy Land to be a divinely ordained ingredient of the millenium. They are among the most formidable advocates and defenders of the policies of the Zionist state. In Holland, for example – until the most recent months – their *religious* predilections played an important role in determining the pro-Israeli policies of The Netherland’s government. In the United States – and throughout much of the world – Billy Graham’s equating of the Zionist state with the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy has been a political factor of considerable consequence. There is concern in some quarters of the United States now that the so-called Moral Majority, composed largely of such Biblical “literalists”, spearheaded by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, may have influence on Ronald Reagan’s approach to the Arab/Israel/Palestinian/Zionist problem. Mr Falwell was one of the reverend gentlemen who, this past year, was reported to have said, “God does not hear the prayers of Jews”. Nothing daunted by this arrogant effrontery, the Zionists – ever alert for *political* advantage – invited Mr Falwell to be an honoured guest at a banquet featuring Mr Begin.

There are, of course, theological differences separating these fundamentalist Christians from the messianism of some traditionalist Jews. The Jewish millennialists hold that first the messiah will come and lead “the children of Israel” back to Zion. Their Christian counterparts believe the restoration of “the Jewish people” to the Holy Land is only one, integral part of the preliminaries to the return of Jesus who will then be acknowledged by all humanity – including Jews – as *the* messiah. The fundamental fallacy of this brand of Christian theology is the same as that of the “theology” of the Zionist propagandists who deliberately attempt to confuse the authentic, spiritual messianism of some Jews with the secular, political policies of the Zionist state. Neither insists upon the explicit, moral stipulations of the contractual covenant with which the Old Testament prophets delineated the God/man relationship. In other words, the decisive, distinguishing element of *God’s* determination that “the people” are *morally* prepared for “the return” is, by no accidental oversight, noticeably absent. *Jewish* Zionist neglect of this part of the contract is understandable as a cynical, political deception. The lapse by Christian fundamentalists is explainable by the presumed chronology of their theology. The moral perfection of humans will not precede the “second coming”. This idyllic state will exist only after Jesus is again active on earth in His resurrected messianic role. He will then lift from all who recognize him the

burden of their sins. So, in the two faiths, the order of "redemption" is reversed. And in this sense, the Christian fundamentalists are somewhat more consistent with their theology than the Zionist "theologians" are in the context of Judaism. The latter are hard-pressed to demonstrate that the ethics and morality of the mortals living now in Israel are so superior to the virtues of the rest of humanity that God would now be justified to declare the millenium is at hand and Menahem Begin, or the Gush Emunim are representatives of the true messiah!

Leaving aside these speculations in theological imponderables however, the fact is that the messianists and millennialists – both Christian and Jewish – operate with their own expertise in the field of *religion*. Their debate and dialogue are legitimate in the context of theology. They both address the imponderables of life usually regarded as the prerogatives of religion: questions of God's will, of man's spiritual aspirations and the criteria for ultimate truth. These are not questions to be resolved by boundary adjustments, superior armaments or the election of one kind of *human* sovereignty over another. Genuinely religious men and women may invoke God's guidance to assist in finding the closest, human approximation of justice or ruth in resolving these mundane matters. And the earnest, agonising efforts of men of real integrity to find the best, possible human formula for such problems may be ennobling examples of human striving to do God's will. But neither the mortal players nor the results should be cavalierly equated with the Divine Plan. To attempt to proscribe the struggle, the debates which accompany human efforts to reach the greatest possible justice and the nearest approach to truth in answer to these earthly problems by having some mortal assert he or she has the authority to seal any one, human design with the insignia of God is arrogance in the superlative degree and a profanation of any of mankind's great religions. Any who attempt to foreclose debate of such political questions by claiming divine sanction for *their* particular, political answers do, indeed, "take the name of the Lord in vain".

Mindful of these religious/theological commitments of both some Christians and some Jews, and distinguishing between these matters of religion and the substantive, political issues of territory and political rights which comprise "the Palestine problem", students of and commentators on international affairs may – even have a moral responsibility to – speak their minds on the merits of the cases of the several parties to the conflict. An additional caveat is for the commentary to be responsibly buttressed by ascertainable facts. Then, partisanship is not only permissible. It, too, becomes a moral responsibility with respect to each facet of the complex problem. It is in this spirit, hoping to contribute to the free atmosphere congenial to democratic debate and dialogue that the following analysis of the role of Zionist ideology as an obstacle to peace is offered.

The fact that, from the very beginning of international recognition of the

territorial/political claims of Zionism it was considered essential to establish safeguards for the rights of indigenous Palestinians and anti-Zionist Jews in countries other than Palestine, is self-evident proof of the potential of Zionism for political and territorial aggression.

The Balfour Declaration offered the British Government's "favour" for "a national home for the Jewish people". The extent of the "favour" was specifically restricted by the provision

[It] being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

When Sir Mark Sykes first showed the text of the Declaration to Chaim Weizmann, he said, anticipating Weizmann's elation, "It's a boy". But Weizmann later recorded in his autobiography,

Well – I did not like the boy at first. He was not the one I expected.⁴

The disappointment can be explained only by the restrictions placed upon Zionism. The stipulated protection of the rights of the "non-Jewish communities" meant a dilution of Zionism's aspirations for a "Jewish State"; and the safeguards for the "rights and political status" of Jews in countries other than Palestine diluted the Zionist assertion that all Jews shared a common *national* identity. The negotiating history of the Declaration and the final text both testify to the historic fact that the British government, anti-Zionist Jews and advocates of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs all recognized the threat inherent in Zionism's ideology to the rights of native Palestinians, as well as the threat to Jews, in any country, who rejected the Zionist claim that identification as a Jew automatically included acquisition of whatever Zionist political/national rights and obligations might follow recognition of the Zionist Organization as party to an international, political agreement.

If demolition of the Zionist Organization had accompanied the declaration of the State's establishment in 1948 the threats of further aggression against the rights of native Palestinians and Jewish citizens of countries other than Palestine might – probably would – have been liquidated. Native Palestinian Christians and Moslems of Palestine would still have objected to the partition of their country. But the demographic mix of the "Jewish state" proposed in the 1947 United Nations recommendation would have included so significant an Arab minority that the Zionist ideologists who took over the government would have been unable, in a democratic society, to structure a state so uninhibitedly Zionist/"Jewish" nationalist as the present State of Israel. And without the local Zionist groups operating within the disciplines of the World Zionist Organization in countries with large populations of Jews there would have been no

The first three paragraphs of the "Status" law leave no doubt.

1. The State of Israel regards itself as the creation of *the entire Jewish people*, and its gates are open, in accordance *with its laws, to every Jew* wishing to immigrate to it.

2. The World Zionist Organization, from its foundation five decades ago, headed the movement and efforts of *the Jewish people* to realize the age-old vision of the return to its homeland and, with the assistance of other Jewish circles and bodies, carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel.

3. The World Zionist Organization, which is also the Jewish Agency, takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State.⁷ (Emphasis supplied)

The official *Israel Government Year-Book* for 1953-54 (p. 57) confirms the claimed relationship.

The World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency for Eretz Israel Law 5713-1952 was of great constitutional importance. The Prime Minister, in submitting the Law to the Knesset, defined it as "one of the foremost basic laws". This Law completes the Law of the Return in determining the *Zionist* character of the State of Israel. The Law of the Return established the right of every Jew to settle in Israel, and the new *law* established *the bond between the State of Israel and the entire Jewish people* and its authorized institutions in matters of immigration into and settlement in Israel. (Emphasis supplied.)

The official description of the legal relationship between the Zionist movement and the Israeli government and the glimpse of the political/national substance of the implementing legislation make it clear that Zionism is an important – even an over-riding – national interest of the Israeli state. It is therefore, unrealistic to expect to negotiate with the Israeli state about anything – peace included – without taking Zionism into consideration even as it would be unrealistic to attempt to negotiate with any other state while ignoring or objecting, even implicitly, to the fundamental value-system of the particular state. No democratic state could be expected, voluntarily, to surrender its fundamental democratic values. No capitalist state can be expected, voluntarily, to abandon its commitment to free markets. No socialist state can be expected, voluntarily, to jettison its dedication to collectivist values. Self-proclaimed protestations of pragmatism to the contrary, it is unrealistic to expect the admitted Zionist state, voluntarily, to abdicate its perceived role as both the dynamo of Zionism and the beneficiary of the supra-national movement.

Whether, or not, such abandonment is essential to a peace between the Zionist state and its Arab neighbors depends, of course, on the substance and character of Zionist ideology. Regrettably, most examinations of the

phenomenon have been done by and their significance has been limited to academicians, theorists and others, removed from the many negotiating formulas which, over the years, have been constructed in the search for peace. The accessible records of these many negotiations offer almost no evidence that the participating statesmen confronted this central factor. It is at least a credible deduction that all the formulas to manipulate territory, compromise formulas for establishing “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”, schemes for guaranteeing security of “all states” in the area have failed because – by design or ignorance – this vital interest of one of the major parties has never been put on an agenda.

Any examination of Zionist ideology must begin with an exposition of the meaning of the claimed constituency of the Zionist state – “the Jewish people”. The term is one of the most deliberately deceptive identifications of a subject of international law in the vocabulary of modern politics. In the first place, it is a fact that substantial numbers of Jews – perhaps a majority of all Jews in the world – categorically reject any identification which would include them as constituent parts of a separate “Jewish” nationality. There is a crucially important difference between the expression, “Jewish people” and “*the Jewish people*”.⁸ In Zionism, “the Jewish people” is the claimed nationality constituency. Consequently, it is necessary to know who, or what “the Jewish people” is, to comprehend the ideology with which Zionism proposes to meet the needs of this constituency, as Zionism perceives those needs. The functions and activities of the State of Israel – which is a Zionist state – are determined by these same Zionist perceptions.

In the Zionist/Israel lexicon “*the Jewish people*” has a much more precise meaning than is generally indicated in the casual usage employed in the conventional media or by politicians or even by those reputed to be serious statesmen or diplomats. In official or authoritative Zionist legal/political instruments “the Jewish people” is intended to mean much more than a loose, amorphous collectivity of individuals who are Jews with nationality rights and responsibilities equal to those of other citizens or residents of whatever country may be their domicile. Historically, the term was a deliberately chosen, ambiguous synonym for “Jewish nation”. Theodor Herzl, the architect of the Zionism which was parlayed into the Zionist state – and later leaders and propagandists of the movement – knew the majority of Jews in emancipated societies rejected any concept which regarded them as a separate, political nationality. One of Herzl’s basic dogmas, asserted in his classic, *The Jewish State* was

We are a people – one people.

No doubt the founder of the political/national Zionist movement made the declaration with such unqualified dogmatism because the prevailing perception of Jews about themselves – and to a lesser extent, perhaps, of others about Jews – was different from the concept he offered of a separate

nationality. But the perception of Jews as a national entity was indispensable to Herzl's embryonic campaign to obtain a turf for the "Jewish" nation he wanted to believe existed and which he wanted the international community to recognize. That Herzl – and his colleagues of the time – knew no such entity existed is evident in the Basle Program which was the operative platform for the Zionist movement until it was superceded by the Biltmore Program of 1942. The Basle Program was adopted at the First adopted at the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. It recommended a four-part strategy for eventual realization of the movement's ultimate objective of a "publicly secured, legally assured home" for "the Jewish people". The third of these strategies was

The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.⁹

The declaration of the necessity to develop programs for "national . . . consciousness" was an admission that "the Jewish people" nationality did not yet exist. It needed to be created.

It is not necessary for present purposes to engage in the polemic of whether, or not, such a nationality entity exists even now. It is sufficient to acknowledge that, despite consistent, historic rejections of the concept by many Jews, the international community of nations has often acted *as if* the entity does exist.

Chaim Weizmann rejoiced at such international perception as early as 1922. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had textually acknowledged the existence of Jews who rejected Zionist nationality and who respected the "civil and religious rights" of Palestinian Arabs. Both documents therefore were less unqualified in their commitment to full Zionist aspirations than Zionist leadership had hoped. In an address to an annual meeting of the Zionist Conference in Carlsbad, Germany on August 25th, 1922, Weizmann, who had been a principal negotiator for the Declaration and the Mandate, told this group of disappointed followers:

The value of the Mandate, apart from being a great success of Zionism, consists in the *recognition of the Jewish people*. This is of immense value, which will bear fruit and will open up new perspectives as yet hidden from our weak eyes . . . ¹⁰ (Emphasis supplied)

Recognition of this "Jewish people" nationality concept is the first priority of Zionism's diplomacy. It is the cornerstone of the Zionist state's system of nationality rights and obligations. Appreciation of the centrality of this factor is indispensable to any assessment of Israel's long range adaptability to the Middle East. It is therefore indispensable to any evaluation of any formula touted to solve the Palestine problem with the desired "just and enduring peace".

IV Who Qualifies?

Such an evaluation must begin with the determination of who is included in this alleged nationality entity. It is self-evident that *the* crucial qualification is identification as a “Jew”. The criteria for determining this identification are imprecise. For most of its history as a political/territorial movement Zionism has been tormented by this question of, “Who is a Jew?”.

In 1947, the Jewish Agency representative, testifying to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, said,

Technically and in terms of Palestine legislation the Jewish religion is essential.¹¹

“Palestine legislation” at the time, of course, was Mandate law. The Jewish Agency’s own definition was broader. According to the same report the Agency spokesman said,

Generally we accept as Jews all who say they are Jews . . . all who come and say they are conscious of being Jews are accepted.

Zionist authorities, both political and legal, left no doubt that Jews – however defined – were to possess rights which were not possessed by others. So, for example, Dr. Ernst Frankenstein argued

The Mandate admits only one collective right, viz., that of the Jewish people to its National Home, while such rights as are provided in the Mandate in favour of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine are individual rights. Under the Mandate, a non-Jew who is not an inhabitant of Palestine has no right to be admitted to the country. It is true that Article 2 of the Mandate speaks of the National Home “as laid down in the preamble”; it then upholds the reservation of the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities of Palestine” contained in the Balfour Declaration. But the right of a people to a land is, without any doubt, not a civil or religious, but a political right. (Emphasis supplied)¹²

Zionist ambiguity in defining “Jew” however, did not long survive the termination of the Mandate. Once the state was established the authority of government was no longer divided between the Mandatory and the Zionist Organization. *Israeli* law then clarified the Zionist definition of “Jew”. Raphael Patai is not unfriendly to either Zionism or its Middle East state. In *The Jewish Mind*, published in 1977, Patai reviewed the historic confusion over the term “Jew”. He says:

All that, however, is a thing of the past. At the present, the most important legal context in which the question of who is a Jew must be answered is the Law of Return enacted by the Knesset (parliament) of the

State of Israel on July 5, 1980. The main provision of this law states, "Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an immigrant". The term "Jew" in the law is vague; it is not clear whether it is used in a strictly religious or an ethnic sense.

Patai continues:

The halakhic (rabbinical law) definition of a Jew as a person who either was born of a Jewish mother or has converted to Judaism was adopted by the Knesset in 1970 . . .

Patai then acknowledges that the dispute narrowed to what constituted proper conversion. But he notes that the disputants all agree the common feature

[Was] the requirement that a formal conversion take place which could be effected only by a rabbi.¹³

In the juridical system of the Zionist state therefore, religion – either actively practised or assumed as an inheritance through the mother – is the *sine qua non* of membership in "the Jewish people".

The Knesset action of 1970 was actually anticipated in 1963 in the widely publicized, so-called "Brother Daniel" case. Oswald Rufeisen had been born a Jew and converted to Catholicism. He was denied the *right* of immigration to Israel as a Jew with the consequent automatic acquisition of citizenship. The decision was made by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Rufeisen acquired citizenship by naturalization. Whether he – or his offspring – qualify as members of "the Jewish people" or as non-"Jewish people" nationals of Israel is uncertain.

V

"More Equal Than Others"

The question is neither irrelevant nor theoretical. Two practical consequences for Mr. Rufeisen, or other non-"Jewish people" nationals of the Zionist state, or of Palestine, depend upon the answer.

(1) First, Mr. Rufeisen, or any Christian or Moslem who is a citizen of Israel but who does not qualify for membership in "the Jewish people", lives in a status inferior to anyone who qualifies by the law of the Zionist state as a "Jewish people" national, *even though he or she may be a citizen of another state*. This is the point at which *any Jew*, whose credentials are accepted by the Zionist state for membership in the synthetic, nationality entity called "the Jewish people", enjoys a status superior to even a non-"Jewish people" citizen. One of the state's foremost legal authorities, Dr. Nathan Feinberg, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, put it this way.

The right to the National Home is granted to the Jewish people as a whole, and not to any part of it; it is granted not to Zionists or to Jews who

have settled in Palestine or who will settle there, but to all Jews wherever they may be.¹⁴

In other words, *all Jews*, wherever they may be, qualify as “Jewish people” nationals. But “questionable” Jews, like Mr. Rufeisen, may not – and certainly Christian or Moslem nationals of the Zionist state do not – qualify.

Dr. W. T. Mallison, Jr., has described the situation as one in which Jews, regardless of their conventionally recognized citizenship, are presumed by the Zionist state to possess a “functional second nationality by virtue of their religion”. People who are Jews but citizens of another state may enjoy in the Zionist state certain advantages which are not enjoyed by citizens of this state who cannot qualify as “Jewish people” nationals. Since the criterion of “Jewish people” membership is either religion or race by virtue of descent from a mother recognized to have been Jewish, the state is either theocratic or racist. By definition it must violate the human rights of those under its jurisdiction who cannot qualify as “Jewish people” nationals. Given this condition *in law* it follows almost inexorably that, *as a matter of policy*, the state must resort to any strategy which will guarantee a *permanent* majority of “Jewish people” nationals.

Whatever the causes of the “Arab refugee” problem in 1948-49, it was commitment to this Zionist nationality concept which motivated Israel’s consistent rejection of the annual United Nations resolutions requiring Israel to offer the “refugees” repatriation. It is the same ideological commitment which, following the 1967 war and occupation of Arab territory, now confronts the Zionist state with a situation which many Zionists see as a dilemma. Anthony Lewis, one of the more perceptive columnists of *The New York Times*, put it this way.

A substantial number of Israelis have come to feel that the Begin policy of indefinite control over the occupied territory would face Israel with a terrible choice: to absorb the one million Arabs in the occupied territory and thus dilute the Jewish character of the state, or else to hold those Arabs in something less than full citizenship and thus corrupt the idealist vision of Zionism.

A noted Israeli historian, Jacob Talmon, wrote before his death last summer that “the attempt to rule a million Arabs against their will may make our beautiful dreams of national and spiritual renewal seem ridiculous.” He also disagreed with the argument that continued occupation of the West Bank would strengthen Israel’s security. To take on “the rebellious hostility of a subjected population,” he said, would be “to sit deliberately on a volcano.”¹⁵

To this point in its history the Zionist state has solved the dilemma by refusing the Palestinians – non-“Jewish people” nationals of the country –

the universally recognized right of repatriation, on the one hand, and by repression of the “new refugees” in the territories occupied in 1967 war, on the other hand. Such policies are the source of Talmon’s (and other “idealistic” Zionists’) concerns that Zionism’s “beautiful dreams” may prove “ridiculous”.

VI “Jewish People” Obligations

Every nationality both conveys rights and exacts obligations. Zionist nationality is no different. The first three paragraphs of the “Status” law set out “Jewish people” nationals’ “rights” in the Zionist state. Paragraphs 4 and 5 set out the corresponding obligations. They also appoint the Zionist Organization as the agent of the state charged with responsibility for supervising the discharge of these “obligations” by “Jewish people” nationals, wherever they may live. The Zionist Organization accepted the assignment in the “Covenant”, negotiated with the Israeli government and signed by both parties in 1954.

(2) The resulting “condition on the ground”, so to speak, produces the second condition in Israel in which “Jewish people” nationals are differentiated from non-“Jewish people” Israelis or Palestinians.

Paragraph 5 of the “Status” law is perhaps most revealing of the way in which the exclusivist, discriminatory character of Israel’s Zionist-ideology/nationalism creates a condition of incompatibility with any state in which – at least in the ideal of law – national rights and obligations are shared by all citizens regardless of race, religion or ethnic origin. The incompatibility escalates to open hostility with the contiguous Arab states which are predominantly Moslem with significant minorities of Christians. And the hostility takes on the character of persistent, virulent belligerency among the Palestinians who have been either displaced or live under repressive occupation in the occupied territories or in the inferior status of second class citizens in pre-June, 1967 Israel.

Paragraph 5 states:

The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is *the central task* of the State of Israel and the Zionist movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.¹⁶ (Emphasis supplied).

To understand this paragraph a semantical exposition of traditional Zionist language is necessary. “Exiles” are all Jews living outside of Palestine, or the State of Israel. “Diaspora” means any place other than Palestine or Israel in which Jews live.

These clarifications make clear the political significance of this section of the "Status" law. An Israeli "Fundamental" law declares the state's "central task" is to "ingather the exiles". The rationale for the law is classical, Herzlian Zionist ideology. Herzl's conception of the world as incurably anti-Semitic was the genesis for the Zionist mission of saving "the Jewish people" by "ingathering" its constituency from the "anti-Semitic" nations and establishing them in a nation-state of their own.

It follows inexorably that a state committed to this "central task" rather than to the protection and welfare of *all* of its citizens will allocate its resources accordingly. It cannot meet its perceived and legislated "central" obligation as the "saviour" of one classification of people, dispersed worldwide and nominated as its beneficiaries because of their religious faith or ethnic/racist descent and, at the same time, provide all of its resident nationals with the benefits of its resources on a basis of complete equality. The two conceptions of the functions of statehood are – and must be – mutually incompatible.

The organic relationship established in the "Status" Law and the Covenant between the Zionist Organization and the government provides the *modus operandi* which the Zionist state employs to supervise the disposition of the resources of "Jewish people" nationals put at the disposal of the state to implement its "central task". Paragraph 4 of the "Status" Law provides:

The State of Israel recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the authorized agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields.

Within the meaning of Paragraph 5 the World Zionist Organization operates in the state *only for Jews*. It services the state's declared, principle function of "ingathering the exiles". Benefits deriving from the operation of the Zionist Organization are limited – in the Zionist State – only to "Jewish people" nationals. But the Zionist Organization is mandated by the state's government to perform this function. It is clear therefore, that the *official* policy of the state is discriminatory. The state employs the infrastructure of the Zionist Organization to put policies of discrimination in place and in other than an officially declared and overt manner.

This convenient arrangement illuminates the significance of references in official records of the World Zionist Organization to "Jewish housing", "Jewish agriculture", "Jewish education", "Jewish labour" and so on, to include many social and economic functions of modern governments. It is a clever ruse, little understood or, at least little exposed and taken into account by those who persist with adulatory observations about the practice of human rights in the Zionist state and the state's civility and peaceful

intentions. In practice the system works fairly simply. Normal treasury funds of the government may be allocated among all citizens with no more than customary, bureaucratic inequities. But the not inconsiderable funds of the Zionist Organization are employed for “Jewish people” enterprises. They provide “Jewish people” recipients considerable economic and social advantages.

VII How It Works

Sabri Jiryis is a Palestinian lawyer who practised in Israel and is now living in Beirut. In his definitive book, *The Arabs in Israel*¹⁷ he provides a number of examples of how the system works. Tobacco is a major crop of Arab farmers. As in many countries, the marketing of tobacco is regulated by the government. Arab tobacco, bought by “Jewish” companies, was paid for at a rate of 64.4% less than what is paid “Jewish” farmers. The difference is accounted for by the fact that “Jewish” farmers dispose of their crop to Alei Tabac. Alei Tabac is owned by the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization. According to Jiryis,

The Jewish Agency does not deny the practice, claiming that it was created to help Jews and no one else.¹⁸

Jiryis says the same condition prevails for two other important crops – olives and olive oil.

In a state where by law the government is a partner with an institutional infra-structure committed to serving one part of the population on the basis of its religious faith it is not surprising that discrimination is not limited to the market place. Social and political attitudes are also affected.

In a *Forward* to the Jiryis book, Naom Chomsky provides an accurate summary. He says, speaking as a Socialist Zionist,

Responsibility for development is assigned in large measure to the Jewish Agency . . . that operates in the interests of Jews with a budget on roughly the scale of the development budget of the government. By such means as these, the state has succeeded in directing resources to Jewish citizens without technically introducing legal discrimination – though in fact . . . segregation and other discriminating practices are founded in the legal system itself.¹⁹

In the Zionist state – as indeed in many countries – application of “law” is not always determined by the language employed in “the legal system”. Administration of the law can – and very often does – bend the intent of the system, even where the intent is to distribute the benefits and powers of the state equitably among its citizens. In the Zionist state the very intent – by definition – is to favour the maintenance and reinforcement of the “Jewish character” of the society.

The treatment of Arabs in the Galilee is one of the most flagrant examples. The demographic facts, including the higher birthrate among Arabs than among Jews, presented a grave threat to the continued domination of the state by Zionist ideology, with its primary concern for "Jewish people" nationality. Israel's Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior, noted that in 1976, "the natural growth of the Arab population in Israel is 5.9% in comparison with 1.5% rate of the natural growth of the Jewish population per annum".²⁰ Ominously, for planners of a *Zionist* state, with this disparity in the growth rate, "the Arabs will constitute more than 51% of the population of the district in 1978".

The Koenig Plan recommended several strategies for making the lives of the Arabs of Galilee sufficiently difficult to encourage their emigration. One of these was "to limit the number of Arab employees to 20%" in any "factory . . . in critical regions".²¹

Another strategy was to be applied in the field of education:

To make it easy for the Arabs to go abroad for studying and to make it difficult for them to return and to find a job – that policy might help their emigration.²²

The economy and the educational system of the Zionist state are heavily subsidized by Jewish Agency/Zionist funds from abroad. They are allocated, according to the Status Law and the Covenant, by the prescribed combination of representatives of the government and the Agency. The government is therefore party to such recommendations offered by one of its appointed officials.

The cities of Acre and Nazareth, with concentrated Arab populations, presented the most imminent threats to Zionist-state planners. In Nazareth the government/Zionist organisation combine, using discriminatory allocation of Zionist/government funds, put in place some of the most severe forms of discrimination against Arabs. Some Israelis speak quite candidly of the results as an integral part of "Judaization of the Galilee".

The keystone of the plan to "Judaize" Galilee was to build what came to be called "Upper Nazareth". In 1948-49, Nazareth was almost totally an Arab city. Upon the hills surrounding the old city the government and the Jewish Agency employed Zionist funds, designated for the apparently harmless purpose of building "Jewish" housing, to construct the new city.

It was built upon thousands of acres of land which were expropriated high-handedly . . . taken by force from the Arab settlements, particularly Nazareth and neighbouring Rana.²³

Not "a single unit of habitation" has been built in Arab "old Nazareth" since 1966. In Upper Nazareth meanwhile, Zionist/government funds have constructed a plethora of new housing. No Arab is permitted to purchase or

saying:

A basic fact that emerges from a study of the history of the last quarter of a century is that the Arab in Israel has been and continues to be a “different” citizen, “non-Jewish”, belonging to the goyim and excluded from the rights enjoyed by Jewish citizens. This distinction, which affects every aspect of Arab life, has been *officially implemented* from the establishment of Israel to the present.³⁰ (Emphasis supplied)

The Zionist state, in other words, consistently puts a higher national interest priority on absorption of “the Jewish people” – those who have already come from a wide disparity of national backgrounds as well as those still to be recruited from “exile – than upon equality for the “non-Jewish people” nationals who remained in the state after 1948-49. And this “central task” of the Zionist Organization/government combine is certainly rated a higher national priority than the inalienable right of any of the displaced Palestinians, now scattered among many nations in enforced “exile”. Jiryis sees this declared, central purpose of the Zionist state as a major factor which has

Helped to keep the Palestine problem alive both inside and outside Israel. The Palestine question seems to have returned to its point of origin, proving to the Arabs in Israel that their problems cannot be solved until the case of Palestine as a whole is resolved.³¹

VIII

The Source of Conflict

However disappointing to the Camp David followers, that conclusion is inescapable. They persist in attempting to find “security” for the Zionist state and peace in the Middle East by Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, in Egyptian agreement to sell Israel oil, in superficial cultural exchanges between Egypt and Israel and in formulaes for Palestinian “autonomy” which are insulting to Palestinian national dignity and self-consciousness. What many Camp David advocates are not admitting – perhaps not seeing – is that anything less than a comprehensive peace, including the right of the Palestinian nation to an independent state of its own, is also to invite increasing disorder instead of security for the Zionist state.

Given the legislated commitment of the State of Israel to the fundamental concept of primacy for Zionism’s “Jewish people” nationality, there is no way the State can implement human rights in any of the commonly accepted definitions of the term. And violence inexorably follows violations of human rights if the consequent injustices are not eradicated by peaceful processes and established by law. When the deprived victims are of one ethnic group, with familial and national or ethnic ties to neighbouring states, the violence has great potential for internationalization. Conceptually, this is the kernel of the Zionist/Palestinian/Israeli/Arab

conflict.

It is a sad commentary that for more than sixty years the reputed statesmen of the world have either accepted – or appeared to accept – at face value the standard Zionist apologetics offered to justify Israel's Zionist commitment for any given period of its history. The most prevalent excuse today attributes Israel's aggressive exclusivism to the state's necessity for both internal and external security. But history supplies abundant evidence to the contrary. Nationalist, territorial Zionism's de-humanizing of Arabs has *not* been in response to or defence against Arab inhumanity to Jews. The accurate statement of the equation is quite the other way around. It has been the sometimes gradualist, sometimes cataclysmic translation into practice of Zionism's ideology which has generated Arab hostility. Arabs are humans, capable of rational thought and the determination of self-interest. It follows that the declared source of their sustained hostility is no mere political rationalization to disguise sinister designs or to make some inherent racial or religious prejudice appear more palatable. Nor was the sixty year old conflict originally spawned and later nourished by disagreements over merely territory or about the possible demographic mix of "Arabs" and "Jews" in what might have been an independent, Palestinian state. *The source of conflict was always Zionism.* There was Arab resistance to Zionist aggression from the earliest days of the Zionist Organization's implementation plans when the majority population was "Arab" and there was no dispute about territory, as such. The now generally recognized failure of the so-called Camp David "Framework" can be attributed essentially to the fact it proceeded on the superficial assumption that only issues of politics or territory, somewhat complicated perhaps, but only politics and territory were involved. *No* formula has ever worked peace in Palestine. From the very beginning – starting with the first Zionist Commission which went to Palestine even before the Mandate legitimated the Balfour Declaration – all formulas have failed because of Zionism's insistence upon its hard core racist and/or theocratic yardsticks to determine full participation in the society which Zionism contemplated.

Unless this is understood a "peace" formula which might otherwise be regarded to offer rationally acceptable compromises on territory or on a form of Palestinian autonomy may simply allow the paranoid, abnormal ideology of Zionism to seep into crevices instead of being heavy-handedly imposed in the style of Mr. Begin. A specific, current example is the *apparently* innocent demand that "Jews" be permitted to trade in land and reside in the West Bank. Zionists want the world to believe this demand represents only a simple problem of human rights in which an individual's religious faith should create no social or political disabilities. But such simplicity is not the whole truth. The rest of the truth is that the appellant making this demand is the very one which declares every Jew is a constituent of "the Jewish people", possessing nationality rights in and owing

nationality obligations to the Zionist state. Even in ideal conditions of peace no state is legally or morally obligated to accept inhabitants who are presumed to have such operating foreign attachments. The objectionable character of the demand is aggravated when those foreign attachments are saturated with an ideology as xenophobic, as paranoid as racially or theocratically exclusivist as Zionism is today.

Menachem Begin is no Zionist edition of a Darwinian sport. He is authentic Zionism. If he had not won the election in 1977 he would have surfaced sooner or later. If he had not existed, the dynamics of the movement would have created him. There has not been an American President – and perhaps no statesman of other nationality – who has not needed to be told that this ideology with its built-in paranoia and inherent anti-Arab commitment is at the root of Arab inability to make further compromises about either territory or the “inalienable rights” of the Palestinians. Statesmen and diplomats of all kinds have needed – and still need – to be impressed with both the character of this ideology and its central role in determining Israeli policies. Only one American Secretary of State ever approached an exposition of the obstacle to Middle East peace which is inherent in Zionist ideology. When John Foster Dulles returned from the Middle East in 1953 he advised the American people “the Arabs fear Zionism more than Communism”. His Assistant Secretary, Henry Byroade, expanded on the idea in two statements which are unique in all the official American rhetoric and among declarations by authorities of other nations. Byroade advised Israel to become a Middle Eastern state and to “cease regarding itself as the centre or nucleus of a world wide grouping of people of one religious faith”. The savagery of the Zionist/Israeli attack on Byroade measured how close he came to the raw nerve of the indefensible ideology of the Zionist state. Anti-Zionists applauded the effort to distinguish between a normal Israel and a Zionist Israel.

Nor, judging by the available records, have “Arab” statesmen or diplomats competently and consistently informed the world of the dimensions of the obstacle to peace which Zionist ideology presents. Perhaps because they have been most egregiously injured by Zionism, some Palestinian spokesmen have addressed the issue. In an authoritative article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*,³² Sabri Jiryis, who is also a member of the PLO National Council, candidly wrote:

The Palestinians may, in certain circumstances, be ready to seek a settlement in the area to which Israel is a party. But they are not prepared to conclude an agreement recognizing the legitimacy of Zionism; no Palestinian Arab can ever accept as *legitimate* a doctrine that he should be excluded from most parts of his homeland, because he is a Christian or Muslim Arab, while anyone of the Jewish faith anywhere in the world is entitled to settle there. Realism may require recognition of the existence

of a Jewish state in Palestine and that this fact be taken into account in seeking a settlement. But this can never mean approving the expansionist and exclusivist tendencies of Zionism.

IX

“’Twas Ever Thus”

The constancy of Zionist ideology as the ultimate fermentation-agent of Israeli policy is illustrated in recently published English translations of parts of Moshe Sharett’s diaries. Moshe Sharett was Israel’s first Foreign Minister and, for a brief period, its Prime Minister. He was regarded as a “dove” by many innocents in the days when Ben Gurion was considered the number one hawk. But the diaries dispute this theory. Sharett’s objectives were essentially the same as those of the flamboyant Ben Gurion. Sharett simply favoured different, more gradual, more subtle tactics. He filled his diaries with agonizing and indecision as well as with reflections of his reluctance to engage in public debate with the charismatic first Prime Minister.

The time is 1955. The setting is that the United States is still interested in cultivating Abdel Nasser’s friendship. The United States was prepared to offer Israel a security guarantee coupled with an attempt to persuade Nasser to make peace.

On August 14, Nasser indicated he was interested in “normalizing relations with Israel”. In other words, conditions were favourable for a settlement. But the Zionist ideologues did not wish a settlement. An important consideration in the sequence of events is that the Israeli population was enjoying a growing sense of prosperity and security. This did not suit the Zionist ideologues who believed the people’s teeth should be set on edge so that when the opportunity came, the country might be ready for Israel’s next move to expand. The immediate territorial target was Gaza. The political objective was to disrupt the growing rapport between the United States and Nasser. Sharett’s diary, for May 26, 1955, records the thinking of some of those who orchestrated Israeli attitudes and also influenced world opinion. The principal spokesman for the opponents of the possible peace was Dayan. And the diary reports

We do not need (Dayan said) a security pact with the United States. Such a pact will only constitute an obstacle for us. We face no danger at all of an Arab advantage of force for the next 8-10 years. Even if they receive massive military aid from the West, we shall maintain our military superiority thanks to an infinitely greater capacity to assimilate new armaments. The security pact will only handcuff us and deny us freedom of action, and this is what we need in the coming years. Reprisal raids which we couldn’t carry out if we were tied to a security pact are our vital lymph. First (the reprisal raids) make it imperative for the Arab governments to take strong measures to protect the borders. Second, and

that's the main thing, they make it possible for us to maintain a high level of tension among our population and the army. Without these actions we would cease to be a combative people and without the discipline of a combative people we are lost . . . We have to cry out that the Negev is in danger so that angry men will go there.

Sharett then adds his own comments.

The conclusions from Dayan's words are clear: This state has no international worries, no economic problems. The question of peace is non-existent. It must calculate its steps narrow-mindedly and live on its sword. It must see the sword as the main, if not the only instrument with which to keep its morale high and to retain its moral tension. Towards this end it may no – it *must* – invent dangers and to do this it must adopt the method of provocation and revenge . . . And above all – let us hope for a new war with the Arab countries so that we may finally get rid of our troubles and acquire our space . . . Ben Gurion himself said it would be worth while to pay an Arab a million pounds to start a war.³³

The eternal, Zionist dialectic again! If the people are not obsessed with fear create conditions to frighten them. If there are no visible enemies – create them! Ignore any hand out-stretched in friendship, for the friendship can dissolve the ideology. The analogy to recent Israeli conduct is obvious. Conventional compromises of the conventional issues for peace will achieve nothing more than another precarious armistice. Arabs were the victims of Zionism before there was Zionist sovereignty over territory and before law, canonized in the Zionist state, formalized Zionism's racism into Israeli nationalism. Arabs know best in all the world the essence of this bitter conflict. But they have been unable, or unwilling, to articulate their concern and to identify this parochial, Zionist ideology as the malignancy metastasising into every one of the more ephemeral issues and making them unresponsive to normal, diplomatic treatment.

This Arab failure, plus the resistance of western "statesmen", refusing to hear or see for political reasons, plus the persistence, inventiveness and opportunism of Zionist/Israeli propaganda have produced in much of the world a one-dimensional judgment of the Arab/Palestinian/Israeli/Zionist conflict. In the west, at least, most of what the average citizen knows about "Arabs" he knows from Zionist, or Zionist-indoctrinated sources. It is symbolic of the false dilemma into which this knot-hole vision of the conflict has directed the world that the Palestinian aspiration for a democratic, secular, unitary state is commonly viewed with trepidation, if not outright abhorrence. The unspoken reason, of course, is not that Jews would be exterminated or "driven into the sea". The reason is that such a state would exorcise Zionism and its synthetic "Jewish people" nationality together with its expansionist, extra-territorial claims to part (or under Begin all) of

Palestine. That the democratization of any society and the elimination of extra-territorialism are regarded generally as desirable attainments in normal international relations never seems to trouble the myopic supporters of Zionist/Israel.

There are a few lines in Orwell's *1984* which are suggestive of the process which has produced this "doublethink" on so ubiquitous a scale.

"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought?" one of the technocrats serving Big Brother asks of a colleague. In the end we shall make thoughtcrime impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly *one* word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten . . . Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller . . . the Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect . . . By the year 2050 . . . not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are having now.

That rather accurately describes what Zionist propaganda has done – at least in the western world – over the last half century. Paradoxically, this ethno-centered, exclusivist, aggressive ideology has been widely accepted as a benevolent, liberating, progressive phenomenon. Not until its true character is fully understood and the wider horizons of the human dimensions of the total confrontation with "the Arabs" are adequately perceived will the ever "smaller range of consciousness" be replaced with the elevated vision needed to create the so far elusive but eminently desirable "just and enduring peace".

(January 1981)

1. "The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Israel (Status) Law", enacted by the Knesset in 1952 and a "Covenant" between the Zionist Organization and the government, adopted in 1954. Both of these political/national instruments will be analysed later in this pamphlet.
2. *Zion Reconsidered*, Jakob J. Petuchowski, Twayne Publishers, Inc., N.Y. 1966, p.41. Dr. Petuchowski's book is a thorough, theological analysis of the differences between Theodor Herzl's state/political/territorial Zionism and the traditional Zion of orthodox Judaism. For a briefer analysis of the same subject, see *Prophecy, Zionism and the State of Israel*, Elmer Berger, American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, 133 E. 73rd St., N.Y. 10021. The pamphlet is available upon request.
3. c.f. "The Arab Stereotype on Television". Jack G. Shaheen, *The Link*, Americans for Middle East Understanding, 475 Riverside Drive, N.Y. 10027, Room 771. April/May 1980, Vol.13, No.2. For additional information about distortions of the Arab image in the media, contact American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1075 National Press Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20045.

4. *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*, 1949, Harper & Brothers, p.208.
5. For substantiation of the statements made in these paragraphs, see, "The Legal Problems Concerning the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization/ Jewish Agency: A study in International and United States Law", W.T. Mallison, Jr., *William and Mary Law Review*. Vol. 9, Spring, 1968, No.2 pp.556-629.
Professor of International Law, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
6. *Op cit William and Mary Law Review*, p.608.
7. *Fundamental Laws of The State of Israel*, Ed. Joseph Badi, N.Y. 1961, p.285.
8. It is curious how often in Zionist history the definite article "the" has played an important political/legal role. The Balfour Declaration, for example, referred to "a national home for the Jewish people". The generally accepted version of Resolution 242 omitted the definite article before the language, "territories occupied in the recent conflict". The result of the deliberate use of "a" instead of "the" in the Balfour Declaration was an interminable debate about whether the "national home" was to be considered a repository of Zionist rights and obligations for *all* Jews or simply one collectivity of Jews among many, in many other nations, with Palestinian nationality attachments limited only to those Jews who opted for Palestinian citizenship. The deliberate omission of the "the" in Resolution 242 has been the source of continuing debate as to whether Israeli military forces are required by the resolution to withdraw from *all* territories occupied in 1967 or whether the extent of required withdrawal is negotiable. The deliberate Zionist use of "the" before "Jewish people" is intended to imply clearly that all Jews are constituents of *one* entity which is to be invested with the political/territorial/national rights which are the essence of Zionism. Few statesmen and almost no commentators or media personalities make the distinction.
9. *History of Zionism*, Nahum Sokolow, Longmans, Green & Co., London, England, 1919, Vol.1, p.268.

For a detailed examination of the legal and political steps taken by the Zionist movement to establish the concept of "Jewish people" nationality in international law, see "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'the Jewish people' Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership In It: Appraisal in Public International Law", W.T. Mallison, Jr., *The George Washington Law Review*, Vol.32 – June, 1964 – November 5, Washington, D.C., pp.983f.

See also, *The Jewish Dilemma*, Elmer Berger, Devin Adair, N.Y., pp.71ff.

10. *Chaim Weizmann: Tribute in Honour of His Seventieth Birthday*, Ed. Paul Goodman, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London, 1945, p.179.
11. *The Jewish Yearbook of International Law*, 1948, RubinMass, Jerusalem, 1949, p.18.
12. *Ibid*: p.40.
13. Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y., 1977, p.22; 23.
14. *Op cit Jewish Yearbook of International Law*, p.17.
15. *The New York Times*, November 17, 1980, p.19.
16. *Op cit Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel*, p.285.
17. *Monthly Review Press*, New York and London, 1976. See particularly pp.161 ff.
18. *Ibid*: p.216.
19. *Ibid*: p.XII.

Precise figures for Zionist contributions to the state are difficult to obtain on a current basis. *The Israel Yearbook*, (1978), contains an article, "Thirty Years of Achievement" by the Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, Arye L. Dulzin. (pp.43-53).

In the past 30 years . . . the Jews of the world, through the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal in the United States and the Keren Hayesod in 62 other nations have contributed . . . over 5.7 billion dollars.

20. "Northern District" is essentially Galilee. The report is unofficially known as "The Koenig Plan", after Israel Koenig, the Commissioner of the district. The report was supposed to have been "secret", but was leaked to the press in Israel. The complete text, in

translation, has been published in a pamphlet, "Palaces of Injustice", Americans for Middle East Understanding, room 771, 475 Riverside Drive, N.Y. 10027. Available on request.

21. *ibid*: p.11.
22. *ibid*: p.13.
23. For details see, *The Non-Jew in the Jewish State*. This is a collection of articles published in the Israel press, edited and prepared and privately distributed in translation, by Dr. Israel Shahak, 2 Bartenura Street, Jerusalem, Israel. Dr. Shahak is Professor of Chemistry at the Hebrew University, p.73.
24. *ibid*, p.74.
25. "America: The Golden Ghetto", *Yediot Aharonot*, August 29, 1980. Translated and published in *Israeli Mirror*, Suni News Service, 21 Collingham Rd., London, England, No.526, November 4, 1980.
26. "Movement of Jews to Israel is Down", *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, Sarasota, Florida, December 16, 1980, p.4-A.
27. "And the Fund Still Lives", Uri Davis and Walter Lehn, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, The Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University, P.O. Box 11-7169 Beirut, Lebanon, Vol. VII, No.4, Summer, 1978, p.23.
28. At the present writing the Israeli pound is equal to 2-3 cents of American money, with an inflation rate of 135% per annum.
29. *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*, Sabri Jiryis, The Institute for Palestine Studies, Ashqar Bldg., Clemenceau St., Beirut, Lebanon, p.172 ff. This monograph should not be confused with the more complete survey of the same title, published later and cited *supra*.
30. In the 1976 volume, p.235.
31. *ibid*: p.239.
32. "Political Settlement in the Middle East", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, P.O Box 11-7164, Beirut. Autumn, 1977, Vol. VII, No.1, pp.3-25.
33. *Israel's Sacred Terrorism, A Study Based on Moshe Sharett's "Personal Diary" and Other Documents*, Livia Rokach, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc. Belmont, Massachusetts, 1980, P.O. Box 456, Turnpike Station, Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, 01545, p.44.

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